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PANEL I:
WHAT IS THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
WHO REPRESENTS IT?
Dean Roger C. Cramton, Moderator

DEAN CRAMTON: What is the public interest? Who represents it?
When lawyers talk about such subjects, there is a danger that we
may take ourselves too seriously. I am told on good authority that
the Arkansas Supreme Court recently devoted its attention to a subject that I last considered in law school-the rule against perpetuities.
One of the judges, carried away by the intricacy and beauty of the
problem before the court, inquired of counsel whether a particular
variation of the rule was well-known in his part of the State. "Your
honor," the lawyer replied, "in Booneville we talk of little else."
There is also the danger of hypocrisy. When lawyers who represent
special interest speak of the "public" interest, they may be viewed
by members of the public as falling within Mark Twain's definition
of a lawyer: "A person who has his hand in someone else's pocket."
A few introductory comments may help to put the Panel in perspective. Our topic is: "What is the Public Interest? Who Represents It?"
Many of you will recall the celebrated confrontation a few years
ago between Ralph Nader and Lloyd Cutler. Cutler's firm had represented automobile companies in settlement negotiations with the
Justice Department. These negotiations had resulted in a consent
decree which terminated an antitrust suit which charged the automobile companies with a conspiracy to impede the development of
emission control systems.
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Through Nader's promptings a group of law students picketed Cutler's firm to call attention to the settlement, which they characterized
as a "sell out" out of the public interest. Cutler was visibly upset and
accused the law students of violating legal ethics by picketing. He
asked the sixty-four-dollar question: "Why do you think you have a
monopoly on deciding what is in the public interest?"
The traditional view of the bar-which is implicit in what Lloyd
Cutler said, and in Chesterfield Smith's opening remarks, is that the
political process and the adversary system are fair and open ones,
which provide orderly methods of participation and change. The duty
of a lawyer, by and large, is to represent vigorously the interests of his
client in the political system and in the courts. Whatever you and I
may think of the result of the process in a given case or situation, if
the process itself is fair, open and rational, the theory goes, the outcome is the current expression of the public interest. At the very least,
the outcome is legitimate in the basic sense-conforming with basic
procedures.
Given fair and open procedures for resolving disputes or urging
social change, Learned Hand concluded some years ago, "Right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is and
always will be folly, but we have staked upon it our all."
The objections to the adversary system-some of which will be discussed by members of the panel-rest upon disagreement either with its
factual or its normative premises. First, there is the assertion by some
that the procedures are not really fair and open either because of procedural defects or because of the existence of widespread bias, favoritism or corruption on the part of government officials. For example,
Nader and his followers charge that deficiencies in public participation in the informal administrative process, such as the consent decree
settlement case, or the alleged "sell out" of regulators to the interests
that they regulate, so distort the whole system that it can't be viewed as
being fair and open.
How pervasive are these warts on our system? To what extent does
it fail in practice to live up to its pretensions? How can these imperfections-if they exist-be eliminated? These are questions which I
hope the panelists will address.
A second objection to the adversary process in our pluralist system is
that the cards are stacked against interests that are not economic in
character or that lack resources. I believe that this problem is a far
more serious one than that merely of representation of the improver-
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ished. Interests other than those of the poor may be unable to obtain
full and adequate representation.
In the first place, organizations do not fully represent the interests
of their members. Does Chesterfield Smith speak in all respects for all
of the lawyers in this room?
In the second place, there are diffused and unorganized interests
which are either unrepresented entirely, or which are represented only
by self-appointed or governmental spokesmen which they do not
choose and cannot control.
Is the clash of private interests sufficiently even-handed so that the
outcomes routinely may be said to be in the public interest? If there
are deficiencies in this regard, how can we improve the system so that
it is more even-handed?
Thus far my comments have been fully consistent with the basic
premises of the adversary system in a pluralistic society. They have
merely emphasized alleged imperfections of that system.
In the pluralist view, all competing claims are merely subjective
value premises. We agree only on an orderly process of resolving individual disputes or of making social changes by means of legislation.
And in this ball park, Lloyd Cutler can play the public interest game
with as much moral authority as Ralph Nader, although he may have
greater difficulty in attracting the attention of the media.
There is another view, however, which should not remain unmentioned; and I hope our panelists will deal with it. This is that of the
radical critique of American society, and particularly of the pluralistic and adversary system. The radicals do not accept the premise that
decisions made in accordance with the procedures of the system will
produce the best results for the whole society.
Herbert Marcuse, for example, argues that the pluralist system produces irrational and undesirable results. The competing institutions of
modern industrial society, Marcuse claims, concur in a common interest to defend and extend their established positions, to solidify what
he calls the power of the whole over the individual. The irrationality
of the whole, Marcuse and his followers argue, goes unnoticed and unprotested-growing productivity for little or no purpose, technological
advances used to produce either instruments of death or the plastic
products of a consumer society, increasing affluence resulting in either
moral emptiness or environmental devastation or both.
The radical critique, in short, does not accept the assumption that
ultimate values can be determined by the conflict of private interests.
The radicals, it seems, have discovered truths, not self-evident to the
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rest of us, that do not depend upon the votes of the political process
or the advocacy and rationality of the legal process. While the value
choices that they assert are subjective, it is also true, ultimately, that
the preference of the rest of us for a procedural definition of basic social values is also subjective. The difference for the moment is that the
vast majority of our society-and nearly the entire universe of lawyersaccept today the premises and values of the adversary, pluralist system.
We have four highly-qualified panelists, and now is the time to turn
to them. Each will make a short presentation. There will be opportunity for audience participation. In the back of your books are green
slips on which you may address questions to the panelists. At the
coffee break and during the latter part of the panel presentations,
bring them down. I will sort them out and address them to one or
more of the panelists.
The initial presentation will be by William D. Ruckelshaus.
Now Bill, as you know, abruptly became a private citizen last
October!
Now engaged in private practice in Washington, he was serving at
that time as Deputy Attorney General of the United States. Previously
he performed distinguished service as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Administration, and also in the Department of
justice.
MR. WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS: Thank you very much for
that warm introduction, Roger, and your kind attention.
Roger Cramton did not mention that for eighty days I was also the
Director of the FBI. I am certain there is nothing in his background
that would lead him not to mention that!
I am delighted to be here this morning to get a chance to share with
you for a few short minutes my views on this issue, vital to our society,
and to the public interest. But I have a confession to make to you
about delight in being here, and that is that-as Roger mentionedover the last five years I have been incapable of holding a job for any
considerable length of time.
Having started in the Justice Department, where, among other responsibilities, I was in charge of the Civil Disturbance Unit, which
went around the country and observed riots; from there, I became the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, where I was
once introduced to the Detroit Economic Club as "the greatest friend
of American industry since Karl Marx!"
Having left there to become the Director of the FBI for some eighty
days, where among other duties, I had the responsibility of overseeing
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the investigation into the Watergate; from there to the position of
Deputy Attorney General, where among other duties, I had particular
responsibility for the investigation of a Vice President of the United
States; and from there to one of the most rapid departures from government in our history-with this background, my confession is that,
not only am I delighted to be here, frankly, I am delighted to be
anywhere!
Roger admonished the panelists that we were to follow the old
adage of George Bernard Shaw, that in order for a speech to be immortal it need not be eternal. So I will do my best to keep what I
have to say as short as possible.
I stated a minute ago that I think the subject to which this conference is addressed is of overriding importance to our society, and I
believe that very strongly. It is certainly true that the definition of
"public interest" is almost impossible to divine, but nevertheless, the
effort to do so must always be a prime goal of any public official.
In my view, the overriding, and in the last analysis only responsibility of any public official in government is to serve the public interest.
He simply has no higher loyalty than to serve the public interest. And
while that may seem to be a statement upon which everyone could
agree, it is-and continues to be-incredible to me that so many people move into government at various levels who have no perception
whatsoever not only of what the public interest is, but that the public
interest is what they are there to serve.
I was talking to Dean Cramton just before coming up here this
morning, and I asked him to what extent the question of the serving
of the public interest is being taught in our law schools. He indicated
that there were several courses in which the question of what was in
the public interest was interwoven. But I believe that not only in our
law schools, but in our schools in general, we need to pay more attention as a society to the obligations of a public servant to serve the
public interest, and the obligations of a public servant to do his best
to define what public ethics is all about.
What often happens is that people come abruptly out of private life
into public service without ever having given 10 minutes' thought to
what their obligations as a public servant might be. And while we
produce in our law schools individuals who will often be called upon
during their lives to serve the public and the government at one
level or another, the fact that we have not given them adequate
schooling as to what their obligations are, I think, has led us to a
great deal of the present difficulties we are experiencing. This is true
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not only at very high levels of the federal government, but at other
levels of government as well.
In whatever capacity I have served as a public servant or in whatever agency, I have always attempted to lift myself above the parochial interest of that particular body-and I must confess that I have
universally failed to achieve that degree of objectivity that I think is
necessary.
Casper Weinberger, whose travels through the federal bureaucracy
have rivaled mine, has said that "where you stand depends on where
you sit." And what we are addressing ourselves to today is how it can
be possible for the public interest to be served when it is so difficult
for a given administrative official to be as objective in serving that
public interest as he ought to be.
When I was serving in the state legislature in my home state of
Indiana, I remember hearing an insurance man, who also happened
to be a state legislator, announce to the assembled legislators, that he
was there as an insurance man to represent the interests of the insurance industry in that legislature. That was the platform on which he
ran, and he thought that other interests that were represehted by
other people there would be able to compose good policy. There was
no mention of a broader constituency or responsibility.
It struck me as very unusual that he would be willing to admit that
in a public statement, but it shows the gap between what his real
obligations were and what he perceived them to be. This statement
passed without much public comment or shock because I think that is
how many people in the state legislature viewed their responsibiilty.
Suppose that a public official does perceive that his primary obligation is to serve the public, what does he then do? From the perspective of an agency or a department head, how is he to discharge that
responsibility to the public interest?
In the first place, I think that as long as he is asking himself the
question constantly, every day, "What is the public interest?" we will
have gone a long way toward solving many of the problems that we
have. The unfortunate problem is that too often that question is not
asked.
But if he perceives this as his obligation, he first of all must deal
with the statutory basis on which his particular agency or department
is formed, or his responsibilities are defined. There he may find that
the definition of his responsibility or of what the public interest isas defined by the statute-may be very limited, or in some instances
even misleading.
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Some experiences that I had as Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency concerning two very significant pieces of legislation, passed at the height of public concern about the environment,
will serve as examples: the Clean Air Act of 1970; and the Water Act
that was passed in October of 1972.
Both of these pieces of legislation are giant steps forward in the
effort to clean up the environment. On the other hand, there are portions of both of them that very poorly define precisely what is in the
public interest, and that failure hampers the ability of anyone who is
supposed to administer those acts in weighing all the considerations
that should be weighed in concluding what best serves the public
interest.
The Clean Air Act is almost a classic example of a Congress reacting against what they saw as too much emphasis given in the administrative branch of government to the vested interests as opposed to a
more broadly defined public interest. The Act itself can be read as an
effort by the Congress to come down very hard on the side of what
they perceive to be the public interest, as opposed to the vested interest. It can also be read as an example of enormous distrust of the
administrative branch by the legislative branch of the government.
The fact that EPA had the responsibility, under the Clean Air Act,
to set air standards that protect the public health without giving any
consideration to the economic feasibility of achieving those standards
within the deadlines that are also set by the Act, is, in my mind,
aimed primarily at vested interests but, in the long run, may well
penalize the public interest even more.
The history, of course, of the use of the phrase "economic feasibility" in environmental statutes in states throughout the country was
that the phrase was interpreted by the administrative agencies charged
with regulating those industries as an excuse for doing nothing. The
argument always was, "Well, yes, we can clean up air pollution in a
given case, but it is unfeasible economically to try to do so."
So the Congress, in reacting against the interpretation, simply struck
from the language of the statute any consideration that could be given
to the economic feasibility of achieving a given health-related standard within a given time frame.
It was true that this came down very heavily in favor of clean air
versus the economic ability of a given industry or a given municipality to achieve that standard within a given time. But in the long run,
it could be the public itself that suffers. The public itself will achieve
one social benefit-clean air-at the expense of many other social bene-
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fits that could have been achieved, had those standards taken into account, both in terms of the standard itself and the time frame, the
economic feasibility of doing so.
To give you just one example, we were told to set a photo-chemical
oxidant standard, which is smog, for the nation. In an effort to protect
the public health, we did so, and as best we could define where that
number should be.
In order to achieve that standard in the city of Los Angeles within
the time period that was also set by the statute, you would have to
remove ninety-five percent of all of the automobiles from the highways. This would undoubtedly achieve clean air in Los Angeles. It
would be a better place to live in terms of breathing. But there
would be some related health problems-just in terms of getting to
the hospital, among other things, if ninety-five percent of the automobiles were removed from the highways.
Obviously, in that case the distortion of attempting by statute to
define the public interest and to set it in concrete could well work
against-in the long run-that same public interest. Similar examples,
I think, could be given in the Water Law that was passed just a little
over a year ago.
I do not mean to imply, by what I am saying, that there is no merit
in either one of these statutes. In fact, I think that they are, by and
large, very meritorious pieces of legislation and ought to be preserved.
One of the hazards of passing legislature like this that restricts and
inhibits very greatly the administrative ability to weigh the competing
interests of our society is that we could generate a backlash to the purpose of the statute itself which would then cause a wild swing of the
pendulum in the other direction. When something like the present
energy crisis occurs, the result would not be sustained solid progress
in achieving cleaner air and water, but just wild fits and starts at the
problem in which no real progress is made. In addition it is enormously expensive in the process.
The adversary system has been mentioned by Dean Cramton.
From the perspective of an agency head in the federal government,
we must recognize that the adversary system will only work if there
are roughly equal arguments on various sides of a given question.
The problem in achieving an effective adversary system is insuring
that there will be equal arguments made on both sides. The most
telling criticism against the adversary system has to do with the impossibility of achieving this rough equality on either side of a
question.
"Public interest" law firms, of course, are misnamed because no
group can represent the total public. Nevertheless, they represent a
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portion of the public which was otherwise largely unrepresented before many administrative and regulatory agencies. I think that the
public interest law firms should be protected and encouraged, and
that we should do everything in our power as well to insure that the
adversary system, as we presently have it, does work and does function
by providing roughly equal and sustained effort on both sides of questions that come before an agency like EPA and many others.
If we move from the question of the statutory limitations of defining what the public interest is, to the more general policy questions
that an agency head has to consider, how does he make sure that the
decisions that he makes have in fact taken into account all of the
facets of the public interest, and that all of the various publics are
represented?
The kinds of functions that the head of an agency has involve the
development of statutes themselves, the issuance of regulations, and
policy statements that are made by an agency head-all of these
things have to be carefully staffed out. There has to be great care
given that any voice in the society is given a chance to impact that
policy before it is announced or certainly before it is implemented.
And one of the ways that can be done is for the heads of agencies or
departments in government to give much greater emphasis than has
been given in the past to openness in the agency itself, in an effort to
open up the processes by which these policies are formed.
In the water legislation that passed in 1972, there was a provision
which, I think, was a very good one, to insure that there was maximum public participation at very early stages of the development of
policy and the implementation of the Act.
We formed policy task forces to implement the Water Act within
the Environmental Protection Agency itself on which were representatives of public interest groups of all kinds, so that we actually had
a portion of the public, which was otherwise not represented, participating in the process of the formulation of policy itself.
This experiment, I think, has borne great fruit. It has forced members of the public who otherwise would stand and criticize what the
agency was doing, to become involved in the formulation of that
policy itself, thereby giving them a much greater understanding of
all of the ramifications involved, and the complexities in attempting
to formulate a policy and take into account the total public interest.
My own feeling is that there is a tremendous need in our society in
general to provide new mechanisms in which the public can become
involved more directly in impacting the decision-making process.
These publics have to be informed in order for that participation to
be meaningful. This is particularly true in relation to the environment.

394

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

And again I use Los Angeles as an example only because it may be the
most advanced of the problem areas in the country.
Back in the nineteen-thirties a decision was made in Los Angelesa very simple decision by the Board of County Commissioners-to give
the highways the right of way over the rail system. If you look at the
hearing record there was almost no public participation in that decision, and yet the implications for the city of Los Angeles were
incredible.
Los Angeles in the nineteen-twenties had the most complete interurban rail system in the world. To substitute for that system a highway system in which the total dependence for transportation for the
people that lived in that valley was going to be on the automobile
was, by all measures, a very unwise decision.
The people who made the decision were not evil. They were simply not subject to the kinds of information and pressures that they
should have been had there been not only mechanisms for the public
to participate but information systems that could have been utilized
to give the public knowledge that could make their participation
meaningful. The public could have then spelled out in detail to the
decision makers the results of a choice of any given option in Los
Angeles.
Let me close by making a strong pitch that we not take a simplistic
view of what the public interest is.
If we can assume that what we are all seeking to achieve-whether
as private citizens or government officials-is a clear understanding of
what the public interest is-we must recognize the limitations of the
present systems that we have created in coming to grips with that
problem.
Again, in Los Angeles, I always had mixed emotions about solving
the problems of air pollution as they related to the automobile in
that city because, if we did that, it would mean that all of the public
pressures behind doing something about transportation in the city
that were caused by their concern about air pollution would have
been taken out of the equation. Instead of addressing the issue of
transportation as they should do there, with a certain degree of
urgency, it would simply continue to move along at its'own pace, as
it has in the past, with the parts of the transportation problem being
dealt with incrementally-air pollution being just one of them. All
of the problems of congestion and noise and fuel consumption and
urban sprawl that relate to the transportation problem would simply
not be addressed.
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We also have to recognize that in that community, as in many
others, transportation as a problem is simply a part of the larger
problem of the quality of life, of how do the people in that community really want to live, what sort of life do they want to have in the
future?
So what we need very desperately as a nation is to create mechanisms-particularly in local communities, in my view-to provide a
wholistic approach to the problems that they face, and to be able to
view the public interest in its broadest sense, instead of as we are
trained as lawyers to do, looking at these problems in a much narrower context and dealing with them incrementally.
If we don't develop simultaneously ways in which the public can
become more meaningfully involved in the decision-making process,
and at the same time provide them with information that can give
real results from a given option that is chosen by decision makers in
communities around the country, we are going to continue to flounder,
in my view, in determining what, precisely, is in the public interest.
Thank you.
DEAN CRAMTON: Our next speaker is Victor Kramer.
Victor has been a "public interest" lawyer in recent years, but more
than that, he is a distinguished lawyer of any stripe-public interest, or
private interest, or whatever.
For many years he practiced law here in Washington, first in the
Department of Justice, and then in the Arnold and Porter firm,
where his practice was largely in antitrust and trade regulation. He is
now the Director of the Institute for Public Interest Representation
at the Georgetown University Law Center.
PROFESSOR KRAMER: Mr. Moderator, men and women:
I have found it especially pleasurable to speak following two other
occupants of the Department of Justice. We served, however, at different times. In my day it was the job of the Attorney General to run
the Department of Justice and of the President to run the political
campaigns. Now it is the job of the Attorney General to run the campaign and of the President to run the Department of Justice!
During the coffee break, a very handsome gentleman whom I don't
know-I am sure he is still here-came up and asked Mr. Ruckelshaus,
"Gee, how do you tell what is in the public interest?"
Well, I propose to answer that question this morning.
Writing in the January, 1974 issue of the Yale Law Journal, Professor Lee Albert has summarized what I would have hoped to have
said to you today had I not seen his article. In the interest of saving
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time, let me quote to you a passage that takes about a minute to
read; I subscribe to it:
In a highly pluralistic society with many interest groups . . . there is no
"unitary public interest." Agencies must deal with a constellation of
interests which often compete with each other . . . none of the interests

relevant to an administrative decision so clearly captures the common good
that it can properly be regarded as public and left exclusively to an agency.
This should lead to discarding the dichotomy which classified interests as
public and private, with its corollary that individuals and groups favored
by statutory protections were merely incidental beneficiaries of a public
right. Instead, participation by organizations of consumers or conservationists is now encouraged because they may better represent these interests
than a public agency. Such representation is necessary not because these
interests are identified with the public interest, but because they, like other
factor interests, are among the constellation of interests entitled to consideration.
And so I accept the modification of the name of the organization
for which I work to the "So-Called Institute for Public Interest Representation."
I would like to mention this morning an example of participation
by consumers in agency proceedings which I think should be encouraged. The example arises out of the complaint the Federal Trade
Commission filed against ITT's subsidiary, Continental Baking, on
account of its alleged false and misleading advertising of Wonder
Bread. The Institute for Public Interest Representation at Georgetown, representing Consumers Union, Consumers Federation and
Homemakers of America, attempted to intervene in the proceedings
before the Federal Trade Commission during its review of the initial
decision. Failing in that attempt, the consumer group filed a petition
in the D.C. Circuit to review the final order of the Commission, because the order, in the judgment of the consumer groups, was altogether too weak to vindicate their conception of the public interest.
The Federal Trade Commission Act contains no provision for review of FTC cease and desist orders other than upon the petition of
the respondent: the corporation subject to the cease and desist order.
The petition for review of the consumer groups relies for jurisdiction
upon Section 10(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
ITT Continental has filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction and that consumers are mere
intermeddlers. The FTC itself-more properly the FTC General
Counsel-is far more cautious in its position. It contends that the D.C.
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Circuit does have jurisdiction to hear the petition but that these
consumers lack standing.
So far as I am aware, the Wonder Bread litigation represents the
first opportunity for a clear test of the question whether consumers
have the right to petition courts for review of those FTC orders
which, in their opinion, are inadequate to protect consumers.
Since I am counsel in this case, along with others, it would be improper, not to say foolhardy, for me to comment or predict the outcome of this litigation. But because I think it is an important development in the area with which our panel is concerned, I have called
it to your attention.

/

At the Institute we are conducting a fifteen-month study of all of
the presidential appointments to the Federal Trade and Federal
Communications Commissions from 1953 to 1973. Fifty-one men and
women were appointed during those years. We have interviewed most
of the living fifty-one as well as a score of presidential appointment
advisors and we have read widely in Presidential and other libraries.
This morning, in the time remaining, I would like to share with you
just a few of the conclusions which we have drawn from our research.
First of all, it is clear that a majority of the Commissioners-by no
means all, but a majority of the fifty-one-were appointed for partisan
political reasons, and not because anybody thought that the appointees were particularly qualified to license broadcasting stations
or prevent unfair methods of competition. What I am saying is that
over twenty-five or thirty of the fifty-one, in our judgment, were the
wrong persons appointed for the wrong reasons.
Second, we have found that the requirement of law that not more
than a bare majority of the Commissioners come from the same political party has resulted in some of the worst appointments that could
have been made. That provision in the law was adopted in order to
assure bipartisanship. In fact, it has not accomplished its purpose.
When President Nixon appoints a Democrat or Presidents Johnson
or Kennedy appointed a Republican to these Commissions, we got, to
be sure with a few brilliant exceptions, not vigorous members of the
opposite party but men and women whom their mentors thought
were safe; frequently bland mediocrities who could be trusted not to
rock the boat.
Political partisanship almost never is an issue in a Federal Trade
Commission

or Federal

Communications

Commission

proceeding.

Party affiliation is irrelevant and, in our view, should be written out
of the law.
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I can report to you, however, that a relatively recent development
in the agency appointment process may work some changes: whether
it is for good or bad is for you to decide.
Until recently, the political appointive process to the regulatory
agencies had long been the exclusive and undisturbed domain of
those who govern and of those organized entities which were most
directly affected-the regulated industries and the political parties.
The rise of a self-annointed third force-distinct from government,
party and industry-intervening on behalf of the so-called "public interest" on appointment matters was a new phenomenon, which coincided with the ascent of Richard Nixon to the Presidency in 1969.
Citizen groups, with diverse, if sometimes overlapping interests and
reflecting various shades of political persuasion, began to take a serious interest in the workings of the regulatory agencies.
The first and clearly most prominent consumer-oriented thrust into
the presidential selection process was the Nader Report on the Federal
Trade Commission. The Commission had been studied frequently in
its fifty-year history with little effect. But the Nader Report had impact, in part because its timing could not have been better: a few days
after it was issued Richard Nixon became President and a new party
assumed power. Change was in the air. The study made many withering criticisms of the agency, but its focus centered on the Commission's Chairman-Paul Rand Dixon-and the report concluded with
a call for his resignation as Chairman so that the needed reforms
could begin.
The consequences of this single report were far-reaching. To begin
with, the American Bar Association-at the request of President
Nixon-conducted its own investigation, and-let's face it-in better
temper, confirmed Nader's findings almost without exception.
On the question of a new Chairman, the ABA recommendation
could not have been more specific: what was needed was a Chairman,
said the report, who had "executive ability, knowledge of the tasks
Congress [had] entrusted to the agency, and sufficient strength and independence to resist pressures from Congress, the Executive Branch
[and the] business community...." The report did not stop there.
With obvious reference to Chairman Dixon, the ABA panel strongly
suggested that the President appoint a Chairman who had not previously been affiliated with the agency.
Nader's efforts caused the ABA study, and the two reports together
guaranteed that President Nixon's first two appointments to the FTC
would be persons who would be well-fitted for their responsibilities.
Competence and ability would dominate the selection decisions; parti-
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san political considerations would be minimized because public attention demanded it. If there is such a thing as a "merit appointment"
it occurred in the selection, first, of Caspar Weinberger, and then of
Miles Kirkpatrick to head the FTC. Weinberger had a well-established
reputation for hard-nosed administrative ability. When those abilities
were called for elsewhere, the Administration turned to the logical
person to succeed him: Miles Kirkpatrick, an antitrust lawyer and
Republican who had headed the critical ABA study only a year
earlier. Richard Nixon, who-in a very unusual gesture-personally
offered both men the appointments, had committed his Administration to revitalization of the FTC.
But President Nixon-like other Presidents before him-also had
political needs which required satisfaction, and his third appointment
to the FTC was of an ex-Congressman from Ohio, who described himself as a "general practice, small town lawyer." David Dennison had
no familiarity with the tasks ahead, and no discernible inclination to
consumer concerns. But David Dennison did have powerful friends in
the House of Representatives, and he had labored within the party
for years.
On the Dennison appointment, the consumer groups were uncomfortably stymied: they had submitted lists of prospective Commissioners, which the White House barely acknowledged. All pleas for
consultation before the appointment decision was made were ignored.
However, largely due to Senate Commerce Committee efforts, the
citizen groups did manage to secure a private, off-the-record meeting
with Dennison a few days after his name was sent to the Senate. It
was the first time such a meeting had occurred, although nominees to
regulatory agencies regularly meet with Congressmen and other interested parties in such private sessions. Those present found Dennison somewhat less than dazzling, but he was basically competent and
there was nothing in his background which could have blocked his
confirmation. A sprinkling of groups did oppose Dennison's confirmation at the hearing, but it was little more than a gesture. On the
Dennison selection, consumer interests had not been able to pierce
the White House selection process.
A legal challenge constituted the fourth consumer group intrusion
on FTC appointments in as many years. By 1973, Commissioner
Everett Macintyre had reached the age of seventy-two. Federal law
required that Maclntyre retire at the age of seventy, unless there was
an express waiver by the President. What would become Commissioner Maclntyre's annual rites of appointment renewal began in late
1970. On three separate occasions, and for the term of only twelve
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months, President Nixon-with increasing reluctance-had exempted
MacIntyre from mandatory retirement. What was once a seven-year
term, due to expire in 1975, had become a one-year term. For all
practical purposes, MacIntyre was serving at the pleasure of the
President.
Consumer groups responded to this situation by moving to disqualify MacIntyre from participation in the Wonder Bread case to which
I have already alluded. The motion was based in part on the ground
that this annual exemption infringed upon the notion of independence implicit in the seven-year term established by the Congress. A
few weeks after the motion had been filed, Maclntyre suddenly resigned-even though his third extension had approximately eight
months remaining. The impact of the motion on that decision is not
clear-the motion, by the way, was denied by the Federal Trade Commission-but there is little doubt that the Maclntyre resignation was
requested by the White House and that the Commissioner did not
resist the request.
Further, this legal challenge was the first instance of public interest
advocates using legal channels to force a role in the appointive process-even though it was from the point of view of removal rather
than selection.
Citizen group insistence on a role in the selection process has not,
by any means, been limited to the Federal Trade Commission. It
was only last year that a nominee to the Power Commission was rejected by the Senate, in large part because of his close ties with the
industries he was about to regulate.
At this time, a nominee to the Communications Commission-who
has spent his entire career in broadcasting-is facing a serious challenge on a similar basis. His nomination has been pending since
September.
For fully three years, the black community-through an organization known as Black Efforts for Soul in Television-waged an intensive, unrelenting campaign to have a black member of the FCC.
Those efforts, which began in 1969, did not bear fruit until Commissioner Hooks was appointed in 1972. And, that selection occurred
only after Senator Pastore refused to hold hearings on a white male
that Mr. Nixon had nominated to the same Commission until a
black Commissioner was appointed.
In one sense, all of these efforts share a similar objective: all are
attempts to open up the selection process for input from spokesmen
who have no ties with government, political party or industry. To
this date, the processes of White House selection-as opposed to those
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of Senate confirmation-have not been opened up. Citizen groups are
still not consulted on regulatory agency appointments; politics continues-as it has in the past-to dominate the majority of appointments to agency Commissions, even though the clearest instance of
consumer group impact on presidential selections-the Nader Report
on the FTC-directly resulted in the selection of two of the most
competent Chairmen in the entire history of the Federal Trade
Commission.
DEAN CRAMTON: Thank you, Mr. Kramer.
The next panelist is Mr. James T. Ramey. Jim has been a regulator and government lawyer for many, many years. He is now serving
as a Consultant to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, but before that, for ten years, he served as a member of the Atomic Energy
Commission. He has also served as a member and an active participant in the Administrative Conference of the United States, where he
has been of enormous assistance to the Chairmen of that organization.
He is one of the most knowledgeable lawyers around on both atomic
energy problems and on administrative procedure.
MR. RAMEY: Thank you. It is a privilege to participate with
such a distinguished Panel and audience on the subject of "Federal
Agencies and the Public Interest."
In view of my background, I will discuss the subject of the public
interest in the context of the current energy crisis and draw my examples from the field of regulation and licensing of nuclear power
plants.
This is a particularly timely subject for me since I am the staff
coordinator for the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for hearings
they are holding next week on means of expediting the siting and licensing of nuclear power plants. The organization and holding of
these hearings should give some insights into the question of who
represents the public interest, as well as what is the public interest in
the energy field in general, and nuclear power in particular.
I would point out, as Bill Ruckelshaus has, that the Congress has
a large role to play in promoting the public interest by conducting
adequate public hearings with wide participation and availability
of data, as well as by enacting laws with adequate objectives, standards, and delegations of authority. Mr. Ruckelshaus has pointed out
a couple of examples of perhaps too rigid, too narrow a Congressional
enactment of a law in the air and water pollution amendments.
I would call to your attention one that was too broad, namely, the
National Environmental Policy Act-the famous NEPA law-which
one could drive a truck through, and which was enacted in the dead
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of the night, without adequate hearings, without the agencies, without
the affected interests and the public having an opportunity to participate in the Congressional process. And as a result, of course,
through the role of the courts primarily, we have had a rather peculiar
kind of administration of that law.
Getting back to the Joint Committee hearings, one of the newer
things that we are trying to do there is to set up a Planning Committee, composed of representatives from environmental groups, from
labor groups, from the affected agencies, from the applicants, the utilities, and knowledgeable individuals to try to come up with adequate
subject matter coverage in the hearings and some help in selecting
witnesses and perhaps even to serve as a sounding board on some of
the policy and public interest aspects of this rather important legislation.
The question of what is the public interest in the field of energy,
of course, has been an evolving one. Historically, the public interest
was thought to be served by state and federal regulation with the
principal objective of providing cheap and abundant energy and
electric power. Such other objectives as conservation, protecting the
environment, international considerations and the avoidance of delay
did not get much consideration.
This need for timely decisions and the avoidance of delay is, in my
opinion, a very important part of the public interest-and again I
take my example from the field of nuclear power.
In that field, AEC's licensing role until 1970 was, essentially, protecting the public from a radiological safety standpoint-that is to
say, regulating low level effluents and preventing nuclear accidents.
Its licensing program had been geared to uncontested hearings, and
they were handled mostly on a case-by-case basis.
Suddenly the Calvert Cliffs decision in 1971 broadened the AEC
jurisdiction under NEPA to include all environmental matters, and required decisions to be made on an overall cost-benfit basis in individual cases.
This period also marked the advent of the environmental lawyer,
and the contested case almost every time. It has been my view that
the public interest in licensing cases involves a balancing of the need
for power and the various environmental and other aspects of the
site selection and of plant design and operation.
Unfortunately, from an environmental standpoint, the benefits of
electrical power would over-balance the environmental decisions in
almost every individual case, if one were to look at it from a strictly
cost-benefit viewpoint. This argues for dealing with these matters
more on a criteria or rule-making basis rather than on an individual
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case basis, and the across-the-board balancing could be taken into account in what we would call generic or rule-making hearings.
However, the individual case does give the intervenor great leverage on the utility applicant, to carry on what I have called "nuclear
blackmail": to use the threat and reality of delay to obtain concessions
from the applicant not otherwise obtainable through the normal, rational administrative process.
This occurred in the Palisade case and in the Point Beach case,
where completed plants located on opposite sides of Lake Michigan
and costing hundreds of millions of dollars, sat around for a year or
so before the utility gave in. This was of course before the current
energy crisis, but we have a present example at the Pilgrim plant in
Massachusetts.
Again generic treatment of these matters would tend to lessen the
leverage by the environmental intervenor.
That brings me to a quotation from Professor Frederick Davis's
article, which I think was distributed to you all. He states as follows:
The fact remains that the "standing" requirements have been greatly
liberalized in the last decade and a major problem confronting administrative lawyers in the years ahead will be the accommodation of new
gladiators within the structural limits of the administrative coliseum and
the fashioning of rules and procedures whidh will avoid unduly lengthening the intervals of strife.
I like that "gladiators and the coliseum" analogy. It reminds me
of the story told about Maxie Baer staggering to his corner battered
and bruised in his fight against Joe Louis: "You got him going,
Maxie," said the ebullient trainer. "He ain't laid a glove on you."
Baer looked at the man with one open eye and replied slowly
through swollen lips, "Then keep your eye on the referee because
somebody in there is killing me."
Sometimes I think that is how the utilities are viewing the AEC
licensing process, which has become a kind of trial by battle.
So the AEC licensing arena is in the forefront of various proposals
to improve this process and lessen delays-and, as I mentioned,
there are congressional hearings to be conducted next week on such
bills as the Price Bill and the McCormack Bill, which would limit
the use of adjudicatory hearings, and go to a legislative type of
hearing.
I would observe that another great benefit of congressional hearings, and the scheduling of them, is the forcing of the administrative
agencies to come up with a legislative proposal. The Atomic Energy
Commission has finally come up with a proposal just this week that
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would go a little further and, I think, shows the trend in the administrative process. The new AEC Bill would provide for going to predesignated sites-the "designated site concept," as they call it-sites
that are certified from an environmental standpoint after an adjudicatory hearing, but without regard to a specific nuclear plant
application.
And secondly, they would go to standardized nuclear plants, approved by the AEC after generic hearings.
Thus once this system is established several years hence, one
wouldn't have the normal construction permit hearings on any particular nuclear power plant, where the utility applicant would submit
a standardized plan for a predesignated site.
This brings me to the trend which, I think, has been going on in
administrative law generally in the technological area, and that is
toward the generic rule-making approach. And also certainly in the
technological area there is a tendency to put greater emphasis on technical design and the role of technical people, being sure that plants
are designed, constructed and operated properly, and that they are
inspected properly.
Perhaps, if this trend continues, we could finally see the situation
in which the normal hearing process, as we know it-at least, in this
technological field-would be dispensed with, as it has been with
respect to the area of commercial airlines and airplane construction,
in which the FAA and CAB do not exactly license each individual
plane or even each group of planes.
In conclusion, I would point out that, unfortunately, AEC licensing-as well as many other matters in the energy field-is being
carried on without any overall energy policy or organizational means
of setting and adjusting objectives and priorities in the energy field
in the public interest. Both the Executive Branch and Congress have
been in disarray in this regard-as anyone who has observed what
is going on, either in Congress or in the Executive Branch, can
plainly see.
Perhaps the public interest could best be served here by the establishment of an energy policy, however imperfect, and the organization
and establishment of an Energy Council of the interested energy
agencies, perhaps with some public representation, to establish priorities and coordinate policy, again "in the public interest." Various
legislative proposals to accomplish this objective are being considered
at the present time.
But in any legislation, and in any implementation, one has to
be very careful in defining the powers of such an agency, and in
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particular in providing for the transition. And again I remind you of
the problems of NEPA, in which a law that was established-was
written, essentially, for Government-constructed public works, which
did not mention and did not define licensing at all-became the single
most determinative and definitive type of regulatory force in the field
of electric power and nuclear power administration.
Thank you very much.
DEAN CRAMTON: It is not exactly an accident that two of
our panelists have had particular background and experience in
dealing with energy problems.
We now come to a panelist who is a lawyer, who has been in the
position of being one of the beleaguered representatives of a utility,
caught between rising costs, public criticism, environmental demands,
and public participation.
Charles F. Luce is now Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Consolidated Edison-known both kindly and unkindly
in New York City as "Con Ed."
He formerly served as Under Secretary of Interior, and as Administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration.
MR. LUCE: Thank you, Dean Cramton.
Fellow members of the Panel, and ladies and gentlemen:
The subject we were assigned is, "What is the Public Interest?
and Who Represents It?" I want to talk about that subject particularly with reference to energy projects and the choice of types of
energy or fuels.
I think it has been agreed by all members of the panel that there
is no single public interest, and that no litigant, therefore, in an
administrative or a judicial proceeding can properly assert that he
represents every conceivable part of the public interest. There are
many publics and, therefore, many public interests.
And I think that it also is generally agreed-if I have heard correctly what has been said by the prior speakers-that we must look
to the administrative agency, or to the courts, or some combination
thereof, for the determination of the public interest, hopefully under
statutes-as Mr. Ruckelshaus pointed out-that allow the administrative agency to take into account and properly balance all elements
of the public interest.
In energy decisions-whether of siting or of choice of fuels-there
are, of course, many interests. Broadly, they fall into two categories:
economic interests; and environmental interests. But there are other
interests which you might call "miscellaneous."
Among the economic interests, we have, first of all, the interest in
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production, the interest in keeping the lights on, the interest in
standard of living, the interest in keeping prices down. We have,
also, narrower economic interests in siting-for example, the property
owners who own property adjacent to the power facility that is going
to be built, or the refinery, or the transmission line.
From the environmental standpoint, we have, of course, most
basically the interest of humanity in preserving a viable biosphere.
It doesn't do us much good to have cheap, abundant energy if, in
the process, we destroy the Planet Earth over a period of time.
From the environmental standpoint we are also interested in health
and safety-perhaps a somewhat less all-encompassing environmental
interest than the biosphere, and much more oriented toward human
beings than toward the complex of flora and fauna that make up
this earth-but still a tremendously important part of the environment. And then we have, as another fraction of the environmental
interest, that of esthetics. We hear the battle cry, "Save Storm King
Mountain," or "Don't build that plant here, because I don't want to
look at it. It will mar the scenery." Or, "It will spoil a wilderness
area."
Among the miscellaneous interests, beyond the somewhat conflicting economic and environmental interests, I would mention, because
I think they are currently very important, interests of foreign policy
and national defense.
How far should we allow ourselves to remain dependent upon
imports of energy, which we will be unless we reverse the national
energy policy, which-by drift, principally-has been rapidly leading
us to a position where half of our oil comes from abroad, and much
of it-most of that half-comes from the Middle Eastern countries.
So, in the choice of fuels, for example, should foreign policy and
national defense be taken into account?
To complicate all of this, of course, each one of us may belong
to different "publics" in the same proceeding:
We have an interest in a proceeding as a consumer. We want to
keep our cost of energy down.
We have an interest as a human being in breathing air that isn't
going to make us sick.
We have an interest-also as a human being-in keeping a pleasantlooking landscape, and so forth.
To give you a few examples of how these interests which, collectively, are the public interest become involved in energy decisions,
let me give you an example: What about the remote siting of power
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plants, for example? Should we at Con Edison build our plants far
away from the city, let's say on the Great Lakes-the remote areas
where not many people live? Or let's say on the St. Lawrence River?
There is a public in New York, certainly, that would much rather
have the plants out of sight far away, and if we put them in an
area where not many people are, well, then not many people are
going to have to look at them.
But if we do that, we are going to have to bring the power down
into New York. So we are going to have transmission lines all the
way from the Great Lakes down to New York City, and people
along the way are going to resist this. So you have got that public
that gets involved in the determination of public interest.
You certainly have the consumer involved because it may cost as
much to bring the power down from the Great Lakes into the New
York area-considering the large amount of underground high-voltage
transmission that we will have to build-as it will cost to generate
the power, in the first place, on the Great Lakes. So the electric bills
are going to go up. So you have a consumer interest.
Currently we have another example. All you have to do is to read
today's New York Times to see this kind of conflict of interests of
various parts of the public in the choice of fuels in New York City.
About three years ago the City laws were changed to try to carry
into effect-earlier than the federal law required-the emission limitations on the burning of fuels which would achieve the ambient air
standards established pursuant to federal statutes that Mr. Ruckelshaus has pointed out are quite inflexible. Accordingly, the City
Council required that the burning of one percent sulphur fuel,
which we were then burning, be discontinued and a .3 percent of
sulphur fuel be substituted.
I appeared before the City Council to say, first of all, that we
would cooperate, if that was the collective wisdom of the City, but
that I estimated that it would cost our customers about $80 million
a year more, and that I was not sure that they were going to get
their money's worth. I pointed out that London, for example, burns
fuels with no sulphur limitations. They have very tough particulate
limitations-getting the dust and dirt out of the smokestacks-but
they don't worry about the sulphur.
And in New York City, starting in 1967 we had, after all, reduced
the sulphur in our fuel from two or three percent to one percent.
I suggested that the city appoint a "Blue Ribbon Committee"-not
of utility people, but of public health people and scientists and others
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-to try to determine whether indeed we were going to get our
money's worth out of this proposal-because it was going to cost the
electric consumer and the people much money.
I advised the city that we had fuel contracts for one percent sulphur
oil in quantities equal to about one-third of our oil requirementsand they would still be in effect today at about two dollars per barrel.
I pointed out that by passing a law which required .3 percent oil,
the city would make those contracts unenforceable, and we would
have to negotiate new contracts.
Well, it passed.
The new contracts were negotiated, and the oil companies, with
some foresight, insisted on escalation clauses because the source of
the .3 percent sulphur oil they could obtain was in p9litically unstable areas, principally North Africa. And so in New York City,
three years ago, we moved to a new set of fuel requirements specifying .3 of one percent sulphur oil. And the air has been great New
York.
But I made a mistake in my testimony. I estimated that the tougher
sulphur requirements would cost electric consumers $80 million per
year. It turns out that they are going to pay three times as much,
or more.
I pleaded with the Council in 1971 to tell the public, "The new
sulphur requirements are going to cost more money"-not just to
let Con Edison say they are going to cost more money-and to say,
"It is worth it. This is a price that the public must pay for cleaning
up the environment."
Well, read the paper today and see what kind of support we are
getting from those who insisted that we give up these favorable oil
contracts and go to this very low sulphur oil:
What is happening?
We have a consumer revolt on our hands. People are refusing to
pay their bills. And is anyone standing up-other than Con Edisonand saying, "Hey, it is worth it! This is the price we pay for clean
air! Don't complain about it!"
Where is the City Council? Where are the legislators?
They are demanding investigations of the companies. They are
demanding that the Public Service Commission be recalled and be
elected by popular vote. And those who insisted that the price of
clean air was worth paying are silent.
I want to talk, finally, about the determination of public interest
which, in that case, was determined by the Congress really, leaving
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the administrative agency very little flexibility, and leaving our City
Council not much flexibility other than the fact that it didn't have
to be quite in such a hurry, as it were. I want to talk, finally, about
the role of the courts in determining the public interest in energy
decisions. Perhaps my views are not terribly popular with my fellow
members of the bar on this subject, but I am going to express them
anyway.
I believe that judicial review should not extend, as it now does,
in this determination of the public interest, to a review of the adequacy of the evidence to support the administrative decision. Rather
it should be limited to those matters necessary to assure the integrity
of the administrative process: to assure adequate notice of hearing,
reasonable opportunity of interested parties-including all segments
of the public interest-to be heard in an impartial administrative
agency. Also, of course, a determination of constitutionality and an interpretation of the statutes under which the administrative agencies act.
All those things, I think, are very proper and necessary elements of
judicial review.
I make this recommendation because of the character of the issue
when economic factors are balanced against environmental factors.
Such an issue is not really one upon which courts are competent
to pass. It involves a choice among competing and difficult to measure
social values, and this choice is, fundamentally, more a matter of
social engineering than it is of the weight of the evidence. It is,
therefore, more appropriate for decision by administrative bodies
appointed by elected officials to implement legislative policies than
for decision by courts.
Moreover, it typically involves complex scientific and engineering
issues which judges are not trained to handle nor courts staffed to
deal with.
There are other reasons that 1 believe support this recommendation that judicial review be limited so that it doesn't go to the
sufficiency of the evidence. Serious delays are inherent in any judicial
effort to assess the adequacy of the complicated and voluminous evidence in an economic-environmental case. The social costs of these
delays can be very great.
The Storm King case has been going on now for eleven years. It
goes to the courts, back to the FPC, back to the courts, back to the
FPC. And in the course of ten years the cost of the project has tripled.
It would have been much better for the decision of an administrative
agency to be final, in the first place-and I say that even if the de-
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cision had been that we couldn't build the project. It would have
been much better to have had an element of certainty at that point
so that we could have gone on to something else.
Furthermore, the very delays which Mr. Ramey has pointed out
may force decisions which are not really in the public interest, but
which energy companies make simply to get the delays behind them
and to get on with taking care of the needs of their customers.
Historically administrative agencies were created to deal with certain kinds of social conflict which, it was believed, could better be
resolved by specialists responsible to the executive and the legislative branches than by the courts. It was the intent that the rules of
procedure and evidence of such agencies be flexible so that they could
dispose of cases more quickly and economically. Further, it was felt
that such agencies would be more responsive to changes in public
policy as reflected in the elections of the executive and legislative
officials responsible for their appointment and reappointment.
The original concept was that courts would interfere with the
expert, expeditious and-presumptively-socially responsive judgments
of these administrative tribunals only if such judgments were rendered
in disregard of some fundamental principle of fairness-lack of due
process or total disregard of the enabling statute or pursuant to an
unconstitutional statute.
If the courts, through whatever verbal formula, are to second-guess
the decisions of the administrative agencies on their merits, then the
advantages of expertise, expeditious and flexible proceedings, economy, and social responsiveness will be lost-or certainly badly damaged. If administrative agencies are required to conduct adjudicatory
administrative hearings, with all their time consuming and expensive
trappings, and then have their decisions re-examined by the courts
for "substantial evidence," "arbitrariness," and so forth, might it not
be better-and I think it would be better-to junk the administrative
proceeding to start with and start an initial proceeding in court.
The present practice of wide-ranging judicial review of economicenvironmental administrative decisions has the further disadvantage
that it diffuses responsibility for decision-making. In plain English,
it lets the administrator off the hook. He can make his decision with
confidence that a court will have the last say anyway. And presidents,
governors, mayors, and other executive officers can appoint secondraters to administrative agencies-and they many times appoint firstraters, of course-with confidence that the courts will take the final
responsibility for any mistakes that their appointees may make.
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My recommendation that judicial review be limited is not simply
an expression of belief that my company's batting average in environmental cases will be higher before administrative agencies than before
the courts. In the present administrative climate the opposite might
well prove to be the case. Environmental protection agencies often
have constituencies they do not wish to offend, and they may make
decisions that we in the energy business think are very wrong and
not in the public interest as we would determine it.
In fact, our company has gone to court at least twice in the last
two years to challenge environmental administrative decisions as
arbitrary and unsupportable on the facts-and, incidentally, we won
both of the cases, and our record in the courts, whether we have
been challenging or defending administrative decisions, has been
quite good. So I suggest that my argument is not one that says we
can win before administrative agencies and lose before the courts.
I do not underestimate the problems that would attend a legal
reform which accorded virtual finality to administrative decisions in
economic-environmental cases. Lawyers would find it hard to swallow
because of the long tradition of judicial review, and their strong
though perhaps unarticulated conviction that the quality of decisionmaking is generally better in courts than it is in administrative bodies.
Some lawyers, indeed, applaud the expansive judicial review which
courts today exercise in cases involving the reconciliation of conflicting socio-economic viewpoints because they feel that by today's
standards judges, especially federal judges, are more "right-thinking"
or "enlightened" than the administrators whose decisions they overturn. Whatever the merits of this feeling may be, to build a legal
structure upon it is to build on shifting sands. One need only hark
back to the nineteen-twenties and ninteen-thirties to realize that
judges, even federal judges, are not always either "right-thinking"
or "enlightened" by current standards.
Sometimes, indeed, administrative agencies make damn fool decisions. But if we continue to place in the courts final responsibility
for society's choices between production values and environmental
values, we will be asking them to perform a function for which they
are uniquely ill-equipped. And the backlash from failures that may
be attributed to the judicial effort could damage the high repute in
which the public does hold our courts, and even injure the entire
environmental movement. If our concern is that the quality of administrative agencies is not dependably high, then we should strive
to improve that quality.
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I believe it is peculiarly appropriate that our profession should
seize the initiative in finding solutions to all of these problems before
it is brought home to the public by hardship and by deprivation how
terribly serious they are.
DEAN CRAMTON: Thank you, Mr. Luce.
We have been running behind, but there are a few minutes for
questions.
The first question is for Mr. Ruckelshaus, and it is essentially the
question of what Nader has referred to as "whistle blowing" by a
government servant. The question is: "What does a career public
servant do when his view of the public interest varies from that of
the agency?"
MR. RUCKELSHAUS: I suppose it depends on how long he wants
to be a career public servant! But, seriously it is clear that we have
some competing considerations here.
Number one, the fact is that no career public servant always gets
his way. If the decision-making responsibility is lodged somewhereand it has to be-in the agency, then as long as employees have an
opportunity to all of the input that they can muster, as long as they
have access to the decision maker to insure that their point of view
is brought forward, the mere fact that they do not succeed in achieving one hundred percent agreement with the decision maker does
not, in my view, mean that they should either speak out publicly
or resign.
Obviously, there are times in which the disagreement would be so
fundamental that it involves a principle that you hold dear, that
either speaking out or resignation may be the only recourse.
But I think that the competing consideration-and one that Mr.
Luce referred to in his final remarks-has to do with the finality of
decisions, with accountability and with the fact that, as a society,
we cannot become so concerned with the exercise of power and with
its potential abuse that we refuse to locate it anywhere. And it is
true that somewhere there has to be someone who can make a final
decision, that has the power to make that decision, recognizing that
there may be an abuse of that power.
I think, as one who has once run several government agencies, the
main thing to do, in order to insure that the civil servants don't feel
that their point of view has never been properly put before the
decision maker, is to provide all kinds of avenues of access to the
decision maker himself and to hold big meetings.
I always found that the smaller the meetings, the more the leaks
occurred, because the people who weren't there were always willing
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to say what went on and what they would have said had they been
there.
As long as they are there and feel that they have had the opportunity to express their point of view, the fact that they don't succeed
doesn't usually concern the civil servant so much that they feel they
have to make a public expression of opposition. And they may also
come to view the final decision with more rationality than they would
if they hadn't heard the reasons behind it.
DEAN CRAMTON: The second series of questions have to do
with some comments made by Messrs. Ramey and Luce and are
directed to Mr. Kramer. They concern the trade-off between public
participation and consumer representation on the one hand, and
extended procedures, lack of finality, and procedural delay on the
other.
Are we getting into a situation where we have lots of voices, formal
procedures, contested cases, and judicial review, but no governmental
decision? Procedural veto-the inability of government to accomplish
anything-may be the result. Do you have any suggestions of procedures by which you can get expedition, Mr. Kramer, while still
getting active and effective participation?
PROFESSOR KRAMER: The short answer is that I do not. The
longer answer will take a couple of minutes.
What Commissioner Ramey calls "nuclear blackmail" I call "compromise'--and to me, unlike some of my younger colleagues, compromise is a political ideal in a democratic society.
I am becoming increasingly impressed and depressed with the conclusion that there are many judges-administrative law judges and
otherwise-who do not like to judge. A judge who does not like to
judge is a very sorry situation. The indecisiveness of our administrators is appalling. You heard Chairman Luce say he would rather have
lost that case eleven years ago than still have it go on-and I think
he is right.
Well, what can we do to improve the vitality and decisiveness of
the administrative process? Basically, I haven't got the faintest idea.
I could tell you that we need desperately to attract and to hold
in the government better people-but that is hardly news, and in
the present atmosphere we seem to be losing good people faster than
we can appoint them.
Finally, the law professors and the former learned Chief Judge of
the Second Circuit have urged us to engage in more rule-making. I
share that notion, but I am afraid I have little hope that more rulemaking and less adjudication will get the plants built the way we

414

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

all want them built, if we want them built more quickly, so I have
pulled a cipher in about two minutes.
DEAN CRAMTON: There are a very large number of questions
that seem to be concerned about Mr. Ramey's views on NEPA. Some
of these are really statements rather than questions, but one which
I will ask along the same lines is this question: "Why should environmental attorneys be blamed for delays? Isn't the problem the AEC
itself?"
MR. RAMEY: I think that the delay problem is a very large one,
that part of the blame is with the administrative agencies-with the
AEC in this case. I think that a part of it is inherent in the administrative process itself and that is why I was saying that perhaps for
these technological matters that this type of adjudicative process quasiadjudicative process-perhaps is not suited, and we might move to
something else.
I think, on the point of what can be done on participation by the
environmental people, by the intervenors, the solution that I have
recommended for years is that the timing is off. The time you get
to a formal licensing proceeding-and you have that voluminous costbenefit study-is too late to achieve any kind of rational compromise.
The time that this dialogue should take place is about ten years
earlier, when the utility is beginning to look at alternative sites. It
is at that stage where they should be consulting with environmental
interests, listening to them, taking into account their proposals, and
coming Up with what the AEC is now recommending-designated
sites that can be utilized then when there is an immediate need for
a power plant, and with which, hopefully, the licensing process would
not be quite so traumatic.
DEAN CRAMTON: There are about a dozen questions which fall
into a common pattern and are directed to Mr. Kramer. They suggest
that he believes himself a Platonic guardian who knows what is in
the public interest.
One of them says:
Aren't you really opposed to political appointments because you don't
want the people through the political process to express their views?
Aren't you taking the elitist view that the "Naderites" and the public
interest groups and the consumer advocates know what is good for the
people? Why are you so distrustful of the "silent majority," the political
process, and the voters?
PROFESSOR KRAMER: Of course, I didn't think I said that I
approved of Hook or that I disapproved of Quello, and if I gave you
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that impression I am most unhappy, but what I said was-and I stand
by it-that more than half of the appointees to the Federal Trade
Commission and the Federal Communications Commission for the
last twenty odd years have been the wrong person for the wrong
reason.
And I do not wish to give the impression that I am not an elitist.
I am. I am very proud of that appellation. I had supposed that we
all strove to be elite. At least, I have, all my life. Now I was very
careful not to criticize David Dennison the man. I would like to think
he is a friend of mine. Perhaps he was! What I was saying is that he
didn't get the job for the reason that a man ought to be selected for
the Federal Trade Commission.
I believe that I have disposed of this panoply of questions, Mr.
Chairman, adequately under the circumstances.
DEAN CRAMTON: There is a question for Mr. Luce that asks
whether he favors the enactment of any of the consumer advocacy
agency proposals before Congress, and, if so, which version of such
legislation would he prefer?
MR. LUCE: Well, I will have to answer that by saying that I am
not really familiar with the consumer advocate legislation before
Congress. We do have proposals in New York State for this, both at
the state level and at the city level.
In our rate cases, we have lots of consumer interests, or people who
are officials who are there to represent the consumer: the Attorney
General, the GSA, the Public Housing Authority, the City of New
York, Westchester County. At least ten parties claim to be there
representing the consumer.
I would say-without knowing what these bills are before Congress
-I would say I don't think that really the consumer will be aided
by yet another set of attorneys in our cases. I assure you that the ones
who are there already are good lawyers and working very hard.
But one other thought on the question of consumer representation.
I think that in the environmental decisions that if legislation before
Congress doesn't include this, it should-that there should be more
representation of the consumer interest in these environmental cases
because the "public interest" in these cases is now being represented
mainly by environmentalists. They are fish people or Hudson River
fishermen. Or in Scenic Hudson they were pretty much aesthetic matters
and so forth. The consumer's voice isn't really heard.
And so, when a cooling tower that will cost the consumers twenty
million or thirty million dollars a year is proposed to protect the
fish, the voice for the consumer is the Consolidated Edison Company,
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and our identification with the consumer in the public's mind is not
complete.
DEAN CRAMTON: That perhaps is the understatement of the
dayl
There are a number of questions addressed to Mr. Luce about his
proposals on judicial review. I think, because of the shortage of time,
I am going to leave those to the panelists who are going to devote a
good part of tomorrow's program to the question of judicial review,
its scope and function.
Several people picked up Mr. Ramey's comments on NEPA and
directed them to Mr. Ruckelshaus, and wanted to know whether he
thought that NEPA had been effective in expanding public participation in decision-making by the federal administrative agencies.
Of course, I was told, when I was down there in Washington, that
Mr. Ruckelshaus' public view was that he was all for NEPA, so long
as it was applied to somebody else, as long as the Environmental
Protection Agency didn't have to worry about it in carrying out its
duties!
MR. RUCKELSHAUS: Well, your recollection isn't very goodl
Seriously, I did think there should be some exemption for NEPA
through the regulatory responsibilities we had under the statutes that
appeared to put us outside the scope of NEPA. But my own view is
that the general philosophy of NEPA is one that not only should
not be discarded, it should be expanded.
NEPA'S primary purpose is to insure that the federal government, in
its decision-making responsibilities, takes into account, as one factor,
the environmental impact of what they are doing. The underlying
wisdom of doing that, and the underlying folly of not having done
that prior to the passage of NEPA, I think, is very apparent.
That doesn't indicate, in my mind, that NEPA is perfect, that there
could not be changes made in it that would facilitate this process,
that it could not be made more clear that the environment is simply
one of the factors that is taken into account in determining what is
in the public interest, but it certainly ought to be a very strong
consideration, and one that has not been taken into account often in
the past and has led us to many of the problems which resulted inat least, in my' opinion-some over-reaction as a society to the difficulties of environmental degradation.
But I believe that not only should NEPA be a statute that applies
to the federal decision-making process, at whatever stage-and I think
that Mr. Ramey is probably right that it ought to apply at an earlier
stage than it now does in the atomic licensing procedure, nuclear
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plant licensing procedure. I think that it ought to be applied at all
levels of government-and, in fact, it ought to be applied by individuals, who should ask themselves, in making decisions that have
some impact beyond their own lives, "What is the environmental
impact of what I am doing?"
We are not used to doing that, and if we do get used to doing that
in the future, I think that we will have a better society.
THE MODERATOR: Thank you.
Unfortunately, our time has expired. I wish we had more opportunity to go through many of the questions that are here, but we
don't. Many thanks to the panelists and to our audience.

